Stanford 41, Arizona 31 | Final Stats (PDF)
Saturday’s 41-31 loss at Stanford revealed a couple things both in the micro (the individual game) and macro (the identity of the team) perspectives of Arizona football.
First, Stanford won because it made more winning plays. Quarterback K.J. Costello returned to the line and quickly established a rhythm. Three times during the game I jotted down in my notes: “better throw, better catch”. Meaning Arizona had good coverage, but the throw and catch were better. Each of those instances were touchdowns.
Meanwhile, Arizona had two of those – one each from quarterbacks Grant Gunnell and Khalil Tate.
However, the Wildcats could not get a third play from their quarterback position when it mattered in the fourth quarter. Instead, both players had costly errors. Gunnell fumbled and lost 24 yards to take Arizona out of field goal position, then Tate threw an interception while missing a wide-open receiver on what could have been a game-tying drive.
Both of those plays will get detailed later as I review the keys to the game and what went wrong. But there is a larger issue at play for the Wildcats, which is the second thing revealed in the loss.
Arizona seems incapable of playing complementary football. The Wildcats have not put together a complete game in all three phases this season, and the last three weeks have been especially glaring.
The defense had kept the Wildcats in games against both Washington and USC, while the offense and special teams hindered those efforts with turnovers and generally poor field position for the defense. In the end, it was too much to sustain, and the Wildcat defense was overcome easily in the second half both outings.
Fast forward to Saturday’s game at Stanford and the opposite occurs. The offense plays well in the first half, but the defense cannot get a stop or turnover to safe its life. As the game wore on, Arizona’s defense played better getting stops, but the offense floundered with the aforementioned quarterback miscues.
What makes matters worse for the Wildcats is that their special teams are not able to offset a poor performance in one area or another. A big special teams play can spark a stagnant offense or help the defense in the field position battle.
On Saturday, it was a failure to cover a kickoff that further contributed to the early demise of the Arizona defense. The Wildcats took a 10-7 lead late in the first quarter, but the defense never had the opportunity to play with the momentum because a 45-yard kickoff return gave the Cardinal outstanding field position in Arizona territory at the 49-yardline. Seven plays later, Stanford was on top again and never trailed again.
Let’s review the keys to the game from my Friday predictions.
Win the Turnover Battle (all phases)
Arguably, the most disturbing trend for Arizona right now is that it continues to lose the turnover battle. The Wildcats did not have a turnover-free game in the month of October, totaling 10 giveaways. Meanwhile, the defense created only two turnovers over those four games.
Saturday at Stanford, the Wildcats did a good job protecting the ball until Khalil Tate’s costly fourth-quarter interception. Arizona’s defense had finally forced consecutive three-and-outs, and the field position was flipping in the Wildcats’ favor. They earned their best starting field position of the day at the 49-yardline and trailed by seven points, 38-31.
The drive started with a promising run by Tate, but it was mitigated by a downfield holding penalty on receiver Drew Dixon. Still, it was a seven-yard gain, which left a first-and-three.
Arizona had nice play call with the ball on the right hash. Two receivers lined up stacked tight to the left of the formation, with one motioning across the formation prior to the snap. This left a single receiver, Jamarye Joiner, to the field side of the formation. Cornerback Paulson Adebo covered Joiner softly with outside leverage, knowing he had safety help over the top and to the middle of the field.
On the snap, Arizona released the running back, J.J. Taylor, to the left. This drew immediate coverage from the linebacker to the left flat. Meanwhile, Joiner ran a deeper out-route, which was going to be tough to break open considering the outside leverage that Adebo was playing.
Tate rolled to his left and had clean protection, but slipped slightly on the Stanford ‘S’ painted at midfield. This slip made him late on his delivery to Joiner and allowed Adebo to cut off the very difficult throw to the far sideline.
The better choice for Tate, once he saw the outside linebacker vacate to pick up Taylor in the flat, would have been to look to his backside receiver, Cedric Peterson. Remember, the pre-snap motion from left to right identified the underneath coverage. One of the linebackers had to bump out to pick up the new threat to the right of Arizona’s formation. The Cardinal actually ended up busting this coverage with the linebacker going too far with the motion player, which left the linebacker and a corner covering the same area in the right flat and no one over the middle of the field.
All of this left Peterson wide open on his drag route across the field. There was not a Stanford player within 10 yards of him in any direction, and the roll out to the left in the play designed left a perfectly clear passing lane for the throw to Peterson. Alas, Tate was set on going to Joiner. Without the slip and with a perfect pass, there could have been a small window to get the ball in there. But once Tate slipped, there was time for Adebo to use his leverage and get inside the receiver for the interception.
The turnover led to the effective game-clinching drive as Stanford went down and kicked a field for a 10-point lead.
This is not to put all the blame on one play, but it is the type of critical mistake that separates winning teams from losing teams. Especially when your own defense is not creating turnovers, which is a problem in its own right.
Win Field Position (all phases)
Once again, Arizona los the field position battle. Stanford had an average starting field position of its own 29-yardline, compared to Arizona’s average start at its own 26-yardline.
This may not seem like an outrageous disparity, but consider that Stanford scored 24 points on four drives that started at the Arizona 49, and the Stanford 34, 35 and 37.
The Wildcats had just two drives all day that started at the 34 or better. The results? A first-quarter touchdown for a 10-7 lead and Tate’s interception in the fourth quarter when Arizona had its best field position of the game at the 49-yardline.
Stay on Schedule (offense)
For the most part, Arizona did a solid job in this regard with success on first downs. The Wildcats gained 325 yards on 39 first-down plays, for an average of 8.5 yards. Run plays (21) averaged 8.5 yards per attempt on first down.
Even so, the Wildcats found themselves in some difficult third down spots. The average distance to gain on third down was 8.6 yards, which contributed to the subpar 5-of-13 conversion rate on third downs.
The most critical third-and-long situation came as Arizona was marching at the end of the third quarter. Bam Smith was stopped for no gain on first down. After the quarter break, Grant Gunnell’s pass to Smith went for minus-1 yard, leaving the Wildcats in a third-and-11 at the Stanford 22 – easily in field goal range. Gunnell fumbled on the next play and the Wildcats lost 24 yards to lose the field goal opportunity.
After Arizona’s defense forced a three-and-out, the Wildcats got the ball back with their best field position of the day at midfield. Tate came back at quarterback and broke off a good run on first down, but a penalty brought it back for only a seven-yard gain. Still, the Wildcats were on schedule with a first-and-three, but the interception ensued.
Stop the Run (defense)
As good as quarterback K.J. Costello was, the Stanford ground game was just as much the difference-maker. The Cardinal had gained over 4.0 yards per carry in only two games this season, but averaged a season-high 5.2 yards per carry against the Wildcats.
That was Stanford’s best clip in 11 games, dating back to a win over Oregon State last November.
For Arizona, it has now surrendered over 5.0 yards per carry in each of its last two games. When you can’t stop the run, can’t pressure the quarterback and can’t create turnovers, you’re not playing good defense. The Wildcats needed to at least stop an otherwise anemic Stanford ground game this week, and they couldn’t do it.
Start Fast (all phases)
Arizona’s offense wasn’t perfect early, but to its credit it produced a field goal on the opening drive of the game and later scored a touchdown for a 10-7 lead after the first quarter.
The problem was the Wildcats’ defense did not start fast as it had done the last couple weeks. Stanford, despite the 10-7 deficit after one quarter, scored on the first play of the second period for a 14-10 lead. At that point, Arizona’s defense had faced 18 plays, surrendering 126 total yards for 7.0 yards per play.
Further contributing the slow start was special teams. Arizona had a great opportunity to gain the necessary early momentum after it took the 10-7 lead. But the ensuing kickoff was returned by Connor Wedington for 45 yards, putting the Cardinal at midfield to set up another scoring drive. Seven plays later, Arizona was playing catch up once again.
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